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Abstract 
This paper embeds a principal-agent firm in an otherwise standard trade model a la Melitz 
(2003) to investigate the impact of globalization on the provision of managerial incentives 
and  on  the  distribution  of  managerial  compensation.  Facing  contractual  frictions  due  to 
limited liability, firms with heterogeneous productivity endogenously sort into different pay 
structures  to  mitigate  different  levels  of  agency  problems.  More  productive  firms  use  a 
higher-powered incentive contract while less productive firms use a lowered- powered one. 
International  trade  within  an  industry  enhances  market  competition,  inducing  resources 
reallocated from low productivity domestic firms to high productivity exporting .rms. The 
uneven effects of international trade on firms that differ in their exporting status and pay 
structure result in more prevalence of high-powered incentive pay, a larger wage gap between 
managers and production workers, and a higher level of wage inequality among managers. 
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Globalization a⁄ects the allocation of resources between countries, across industries and
across ￿rms. Naturally, ￿rms respond by restructuring their organization of production.
The mass media is replete with discussion about innovative management in the face of global
competition. One hot debate is how to motivate and reward managers in a global context.
Does globalization make managerial slack less tolerable and create a need to change the way
managers are paid? Does globalization cause a surge of managerial compensation and in-
crease wage inequality? Despite the real world relevance, systematic theoretical analysis to
answer these questions is lacking. This paper provides a micro-founded theory to address
the issue of how globalization a⁄ects the provision of incentives, the returns to managers and
ultimately the distribution of wage.
My analysis encompasses three basic building blocks: the contractual frictions in the pro-
vision of managerial incentives inside ￿rms, the sorting of pay structures across ￿rms on the
basis of productivity, and the impact of international trade on resource reallocation within
industries. Because of contractual frictions, providing high-powered incentives is costly. Only
when a manager￿ s incentive makes a large di⁄erence to his employer will a high-powered but
expensive pay scheme be used to motivate the manager. In an economy where the value
of managerial incentive increases in ￿rms￿productivity, positive sorting of pay structures
emerges: more productive ￿rms adopt a high-powered pay contract while less productive
￿rms use a low-powered one. International trade selects more productive ￿rms into export-
ing, inducing resources to be reallocated from lower productivity domestic ￿rms to higher
productivity exporting ￿rms. In response to global competition, the most productive ￿rms
strengthen the power of managerial pay; the least productive ￿rms exit; intermediate ￿rms
adjust at the organizational margin. The uneven e⁄ects of globalization on ￿rms that di⁄er
in their exporting status and pay structure result in more prevalence of high-powered in-
centive pay, an increase in the average managerial compensation, a wider wage gap between
managers and production workers, and a higher level of inequality among managers.
Central in my analysis is the introduction of a modern managerial ￿rm into an otherwise
standard trade model a la Melitz (2003). First, managers di⁄er from other workers. A man-
ager can provide a local public-good type of service to a⁄ect a ￿rm￿ s productivity. However,
the provision of managerial service requires managerial e⁄ort. Second, ownership and control
rights are separate, and agency problems exist between the owner and the manager inside
a ￿rm. A manager may not provide su¢ cient service if his pay contract is not designed to
induce proper incentive. Contractual frictions, for instance limited liability ￿ the one that
I model in this paper ￿ make the provision of high-powered incentive costly, because a ￿rm
needs to sacri￿ce rent to compensate a manager￿ s unwillingness to accept a severe punishment
in a bad situation.
Based on the model developed by Wu (2011), I demonstrate a closed economy market
equilibrium in which people with di⁄erent managerial talent are sorted into di⁄erent occu-
2pations and pay structures. The least talented people become production workers. Mediocre
people become managers in less productive ￿rms. As the value of their managerial e⁄ort is
not large enough, the optimal incentive contract is a low-powered ￿xed-bonus pay scheme.
The most talented people are employed by the most productive ￿rms, and it is optimal to of-
fer them a high-powered equity-based pay scheme to induce managerial e⁄ort that is of great
value. In a monopolistic competition framework with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, I show that
the sorting of pay structures generates a highly skewed wage distribution. Production work-
ers receive a ￿ at wage. Managers in less productive ￿rms receive a ￿xed bonus, the amount
of which is ￿xed in expectation. Managers in more productive ￿rms share pro￿ts, and their
pay level is ampli￿ed by the market value of ￿rms. The top earning distribution therefore
displays a strong convexity, analogous to the superstar e⁄ect discussed by Rosen (1981). The
equity-based pay structure inside the ￿rm and the scale-of-operations e⁄ect through the mar-
ket constitute the source of a large wage gap between managers and production workers and
the earning inequality within the managerial class.
I extend this closed economy model to an open economy with trade between two identical
countries. Trade takes place within an industry because of the consumers￿"love for varieties"
preferences as in Krugman (1979). To have access to the foreign market, a ￿rm needs to pay
a ￿xed cost and a variable trade cost. Signi￿cant trade barriers prevent low productive ￿rms
from exporting. My model then features two types of sorting along the same dimension of
￿rm productivity: ￿rms are positively sorted by pay contract and by exporting status. More
productive ￿rms are more likely to use high-powered incentive pay, and are more likely to
export. The two sorting mechanisms depend on and intertwine with one another, generating
three main results that are of both theoretical and empirical signi￿cance.
The ￿rst main result concerns the impact of globalization on the provision of managerial
incentives. As in Melitz (2003), the positive selection of ￿rms into the international market
induces resources reallocated from local ￿rms, which su⁄er from tougher competition in the
domestic market, to global ￿rms, which gain from market enlargement. If the bene￿t from
market enlargement dominates the loss because of tougher competition, a ￿rm using the low-
powered incentive structure is now willing to switch to the high-powered one. Conversely, if
the market competition e⁄ect dominates, a ￿rm may be forced to abandon the higher-powered
but more costly pay structure. Globalization confronts ￿rms with a trade-o⁄ between the
enlargement in the new market and the shrinkage of the existing market. This is analogous
to the trade-o⁄ between the business-stealing e⁄ect and the business-stolen e⁄ect in the
literature on competition and managerial incentives (e.g., Hermalin 1992; Schmidt 1997;
Raith 2003; Vives 2008). Compared with their homogeneous ￿rm setting, what I highlight is
the heterogeneous e⁄ect of market competition: globalization may cause an opposite impact
on the pay structure and managerial incentives in ￿rms with di⁄erent productivity. Under
certain conditions, globalization does discipline managerial slack, through crowding out the
lower-powered incentive structure. At the average level, this implication is consistent with the
3empirical ￿nding that global competition enhances the power of incentive provisions inside
￿rms (Cunat and Guadalupe 2005, 2009). But the heterogeneous e⁄ects of competition and
the impact on the composition of pay structure call for further empirical examination.
The second result is that opening to trade increases the wage gap between managers and
production workers, and the wage inequality among managers. This result is consistent with
the empirical ￿ndings that trade liberalization tends to increase the wage inequality between
skilled and unskilled labor (Goldberg and Pavcnick 2007 and the references therein), and
the within-group wage inequality (e.g., Attanasio et al 2004; Menezes-Filho et al 2008). The
general intuition stems from the across-￿rm resource allocation e⁄ect of trade, which in turn
increases the dispersion of wages that are positively correlated with ￿rm revenues.1 The
literature has widely discussed the wage premium due to ￿rm size and the wage premium
due to exporting. I introduce a new wage premium due to the pay structure that is derived
from the optimal contractual design to mitigate agency problems inside ￿rms. Only when the
value of a worker￿ s e⁄ort is large enough for a ￿rm to use a sharing wage contract will ￿rm
size and exporting status become legitimate for a higher wage. Therefore the adjustment
of ￿rms at the organizational margin and the composition of pay structure in the market
play a key role in determining the impact of trade on wage distribution. The introduction of
this organizational feature distinguishes my research from the existing studies that emphasize
matching between production technology and skills (Manasse and Turrini 2001; Yeaple 2005;
Bustos 2011), competitive assignment (Ohnsorge and Tre￿ er 2007; Costinot and Vogel 2010;
Sampson 2010; Monte 2011), searching frictions in labor market (Helpman and Itskhoki 2010;
Helpman et al 2010), and concerns of e¢ ciency wage (Davis and Harrigan 2008) or fair wages
(Egger and Kreickemeier 2009; Amiti and Davis 2011).
Related to the ￿rst two results, the third one demonstrates a non-monotonic relationship
between wage inequality and trade openness. Moving from autarky to a low level, and
then to a high level of trade openness, both the average level of managerial pay and the
within-manager wage inequality ￿rst rise, and then decline. This result echoes the insight by
Helpman et al (2010), who point out that the distribution of exporting wage premium varies
with the level of trade openness. In my paper, the pay structure wage premium, together with
the exporting wage premium, drives this non-monotonicity. The transmission mechanism
is through ￿rms￿adjustments at both the entry and the organizational margins, and the
resulting composition of pay structures in the market. Intuitively, when the level of trade
openness is low, only a few highly productive ￿rms play in the global market. Most ￿rms,
mixing with di⁄erent pay structures, are con￿ned in the domestic market. They su⁄er from
import penetration without being compensated through exporting. At the entry margin,
the least productive ￿rms, together with their low-powered pay structures, exit. At the
organizational margin, some ￿rms cannot a⁄ord the equity-based pay structure and switch to
1Helpman et al (2009, 2010) provide a general framework to show that the result holds for a class of models
satisfying reasonable conditions.
4the low-powered pay structure. The two forces o⁄set one another, leaving the composition of
pay structures in the market barely changed. The managerial average compensation increases
as a consequence of a small fraction of highly incentivized managers in global ￿rms. When
trade barriers decline so that ￿rms with lower productivity can enter the international market,
the advantage of the few exporting ￿rms that were in the global market diminishes with
the number of exporting ￿rms. On the one hand, the selection e⁄ect at the entry margin
is strengthened, as competition in the domestic market becomes more ￿erce. On the other
hand, at the organizational margin, the adjustment from the high-powered to the low-powered
pay structure slows down or even reverses, because more ￿rms earn pro￿ts from sales in the
foreign market. As a result, the fraction of ￿rms that use the high-powered incentive structure
increases. Transforming from a low level to a high level of trade openness, the average wage
and the wage dispersion among managers who receive equity-based pay decrease. The higher
average managerial compensation is driven by the composition of pay structures, rather than
the level e⁄ect. When the level of trade openness is high enough for all ￿rms to export, no
￿rm is discriminated by its export status. The adjustment at the entry margin slows down,
yielding a more balanced distribution of pay structure in the market. In consequence, both
the average managerial pay and the within-manager wage inequality are reduced, although
still higher than in autarky.
The current research contributes to the recent studies that attempt to open the black-box
of ￿rms in international trade. This literature has analyzed the boundary of ￿rms (McLaren
2000; Antras 2003; Antras and Helpman 2004), organizational hierarchies (Antras et al 2005,
2008), delegation of power inside ￿rms (Marin and Verdier 2008, 2010), and team matching
(Sly 2011). However, the role of pay structure has received little attention in the trade
literature, in sharp contrast with the wide application of optimal pay contract in other ￿elds.
With regard to the research on managerial incentives in international trade, my paper is
closely related to Horn et al (1995), Grossman and Helpman (2004), and Vogel (2007). But
none of these papers is intended to address the issue of managerial compensation. They do
not specify a concrete managerial function, from which various pay structures are derived to
reward di⁄erent managers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the basics of
the model. Section 3 establishes the equilibrium in a closed economy, and characterizes the
distribution of pay structure and pay level. Section 4 analyzes the impact of international
trade, proceeding from a low level to a high level of trade openness. Section 5 concludes. All
the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
In this section, I lay out the building blocks of the model. The speci￿cation of economic
environments follows closely the standard treatment in the literature of trade with heteroge-
5neous ￿rms (Melitz 2003; Bernard et al 2007; Chaney 2008). For simplicity, I abstract from
the dynamics of ￿rm entry and exit. The speci￿cation of the organizational structure inside
￿rms is a simpli￿ed version of Wu (2011).
2.1 Economic Environments
Endowment The economy has a continuum of people with a mass normalized to one. Each
person is endowed with one unit of homogenous raw labour, and with heterogenous managerial
talent whose distribution will be speci￿ed later. The managerial talent can be interpreted
as entrepreneurship and general ability embodied in human capital, which is not industry
speci￿c and can be adapted to any technology. There exists a su¢ ciently large number of
technologies in the economy. Each technology produces one variety of goods, and is owned
by a ￿rm.
Preferences A representative individual, independent of her ability and occupation,








where q! is the consumption of one variety of di⁄erentiated goods ! from an endogenous
continuum of bundles ￿. The parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] measures the degree of substitutability
between any pair of di⁄erentiated varieties. The corresponding elasticity of substitution
is ￿ = 1
1￿￿ > 1: A larger ￿ or ￿ means that the varieties are more substitutable or less
di⁄erentiated.
It is well known that the CES preference yields the demand for each variety ! : q! =
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is an aggregate price index. De￿ne aggregate spending R ￿ PQ: Then the expenditure (rev-
enue) on a single variety can be expressed as r! = q!p! = R(
p!
P )1￿￿:
Production The only input in production is labor, provided by either a worker or a
manager. A technology can be thought of as a stock of capital. The production features
increasing returns to scale. A technology with productivity a produces q units of a ￿nal
product at a cost c(q) =
q
a +F in terms of the homogenous raw labor. Here 1
a is the marginal
cost, and F is the irreversible ￿xed cost such as overhead costs and distribution costs.
Product Market The structure of the product market is monopolistic competition.
Given the above preferences and production technology, the pricing rule for each variety





The corresponding demand and revenue are respectively
q(a) = Q(a￿P)￿ and r(a) = R(a￿P)￿￿1:








In the presence of heterogenous ￿rms, the relative sales and relative revenues of two ￿rms












)￿￿1; for all i; j 2 ￿: (2)
These relations show that a more productive ￿rm produces more output, earns more pro￿ts,
and has a larger size (in terms of both employment of workers and sale revenues). I will,
therefore, not distinguish a more productive ￿rm from a larger ￿rm.
2.2 The Firm
Now I start to open the black-box of a ￿rm. The ￿rm in this model departs from the
neoclassical ￿rm in two aspects: the existence of a functional manager and the separation of
ownership and control rights.
2.2.1 The Function of Manager
The value of a manager for a ￿rm comes from two factors: managerial talent and managerial
e⁄ort. Managerial talent is an important source of ￿rm productivity. For analytical simplicity,
I makes the extreme assumption that a ￿rm￿ s initial productivity is determined solely by the
talent of the manager it hires, following Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982). Therefore the initial
distribution of ￿rm productivity is the distribution of managerial talent. 2 I assume that the
managerial talent a is drawn from a continuous function G(a) with well de￿ned probability
density g(a) over the domain (0;1).3
The margin of managerial talent is ￿xed by assumption. What￿ s variable is managerial
e⁄ort. A manager can adjust his e⁄ort to provide managerial service. The most important
aspect of this managerial service is its local public good property. The core activities of a
manager are to set up business strategies, to select pro￿table projects, to coordinate and
motivate workers etc. All these activities will improve the total productivity of the whole
workforce within a ￿rm. Two types of cost are associated with the provision of managerial
service. First, a manager needs to invest time and energy in all kinds of managerial activities.
Second, the e⁄ect of managerial service on a ￿rm is uncertain. Managerial failures abound.
A simple way to ￿x the above ideas is as follows. A manager with talent a (in a ￿rm with
2The qualitative result will be unchanged if I allow positive assignment between heterogenous talent and
heterogenous ￿rms as in Manasse and Turrini (2001), Costinot and Vogel (2010) and Monte (2011).
3I allow a person￿ s managerial talent to reach an arbitrarily large upper bound for expository convenience.
The results will not a⁄ected if we impose a ￿nite upper bound on the domain of managerial talent.
7initial productivity a) exerts e⁄ort e after incurring a cost C(e) in terms of raw labor.4 With
probability e, the ￿rm is in a good managerial state, and its total factor productivity will
shift up to ’a, ’ > 1. With probability 1 ￿ e; the ￿rm is in a bad managerial state, and its
total factor productivity remains unchanged. Implicitly I assume that a manager￿ s talent is
speci￿c to a single di⁄erentiated variety, and this limits his span of control.
If a manager owns a ￿rm, he is the residual claimant and will always exert the ￿rst best
level of e⁄ort to equate the marginal cost of his e⁄ort and the marginal value of social surplus.
However, ownership and control rights are separate in most modern ￿rms. Without being
properly compensated, a manager is likely to shirk. This gives the crucial role of optimal pay
structure.
2.2.2 Contracting with Limited Liability Constraints
The managerial labor market is potentially complicated because of searching, matching, com-
petition, and turnovers. As my focus is on the internal pay structure, I abstract away from the
complications in the external labor market. Searching is assumed to be prohibitively costly.
After matching with each other, a pair of ￿rm and manager will maintain their employer-
employee relationship until one party chooses to exit the market.5 This assumption pushes
down the outside option of a manager, though heterogenous in talent, to the same minimum
level, and allows the ￿rms to retain positive rent.6
Speci￿cally, a technology owner (the principal, she) posts a managerial vacancy in the
labor market. After meeting a manager (the agent, he), the principal observes his managerial
talent and makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the manager. If the o⁄er is rejected, the principal
will exit the market, and the manager will choose the alternative occupation as a production
worker. If the o⁄er is accepted, the manager converts his talent to the ￿rm￿ s productivity,
production workers are employed, and production starts.
I introduce inside the ￿rm a classic agency problem between the principal and the agent:
moral hazard with limited liability. Two key assumptions are imposed. First, managerial
e⁄ort is unobservable, and the principal and the agent can only contract on observable pro￿ts
of the ￿rm. Second, both parties are risk neutral, but the pay contract is subject to limited
liability: the principal￿ s ability to reward (punish) the manager is constrained by the latter￿ s
wealth.
The owner of a ￿rm with productivity a maximizes her expected value by o⁄ering a wage
4Note that I model the cost of managerial e⁄ort as a managerial cost subtracted from the manager￿ s income,
following a broad interpretation of managerial e⁄orts as investment in human capital. It would be equivalent
to model the cost of managerial e⁄ort as disutility that is separable from income as in Grossman and Helpman
(2004).
5It would be equivalent to assume random matching between ￿rms and managers, and the ￿rm productivity
is match speci￿c as in Helpman et al (2009, 2010).
6In this model, managerial talent is scarce while technologies are abundant. If searching is costless, all the
rent will shift to the managers. As long as searching is imperfect, the qualitative results about pay structures
in my model will remain similar, but the split of surplus will depend on a complex bargaining process.
8pro￿le fb(’a);b(a);s(a)g, where b(’a) is the contingent payment (bonus) to the manager in
a good managerial state when the ￿rm￿ s observed productivity is ’a, b(a) is the contingent
payment in a bad managerial state when the productivity remains at the initial level a, and
s(a) is a non-contingent transfer (￿ at salary) from the owner to the manager. Given the
economic environment in Section 2.1, a ￿rm with productivity a will realize pro￿ts ￿(a) =
r(a)
￿ ￿ F: Let the cost function of e take a quadratic form 1
2ke2 with k > 0, satisfying the




e[￿(’a) ￿ b(’a)] + (1 ￿ e)[￿(a) ￿ b(a)] ￿ s(a) (3)
subject to
(PC) : eb(’a) + (1 ￿ e)b(a) ￿
1
2k
e2 + s(a) ￿ 1;
(IC) : e 2 argmax




(WC) : minfb(’a) + s(a);b(a) + s(a)g ￿ w = 0:
Here PC is the participation constraint, meaning that the net return to the manager by
working for the ￿rm should be no less than his outside option as a production worker whose
wage is normalized to one; IC is the incentive compatibility constraint, as a rational manager
will maximize his expected payo⁄s; WC is the wealth constraint or limited liability constraint,
saying that regardless of the managerial state, the owner cannot pay the manager less than
w, which is assumed to be zero.7 I assume the existence of an interior solution for the
managerial e⁄ort e 2 (0;1) to capture the idea that no matter how smart and diligent he is,
the manager cannot ensure a hundred percent of success in a complex business world. This
interior solution is guaranteed by a su¢ ciently small k.
2.2.3 Optimal Pay Contract
If there were no wealth constraint, the ￿rst best e⁄ort is achievable as the two parties are risk
neutral. Even in the presence of the wealth constraint, the ￿rst best e⁄ort can be implemented
by "selling the store" to the manager if his future income in any state is su¢ cient to "buy
the store". This ownership transfer contract will result in a class of self-employed managers,
as discussed in detail in Wu (2011). The main interest of the current paper is on the salaried
managers employed by others. Therefore I rule out this type of contract by assuming that
it is infeasible to transfer ownership without an up-front payment. Given the binding wealth
constraint, only second best e⁄orts are feasible.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the wealth constraint is binding.
1) When the participation constraint is binding (indicated by BP), the optimal contract takes
7For a genreal treatment of w, see Wu (2011).
9the form: fs(a) = 0; b(a) = 0; bBP(’a) =
q
2




2) When the participation constraint is relaxed (indicated by RP), the optimal contract is
fs(a) = 0;b(a) = 0; bRP(’a) = 1
2
(’￿￿1￿1)




Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma is intuitive. Because of unobservable managerial e⁄ort and uncertain out-
comes, the principal tries to use a contingent performance pay scheme to induce managerial
incentives by rewarding his good management and punishing his bad management. However,
the binding wealth constraint limits the principal￿ s ability to punish bad management. Thus
the principal has to rely more on rewards to induce desirable managerial incentives. A high
payment for good management encourages managerial e⁄ort, but leaves positive rent to the
manager over his outside option. This trade-o⁄ between inducing managerial e⁄ort and giv-
ing up the limited liability rent depends on whether or not the participation constraint binds.
A binding participation constraint implies that it is not worthwhile giving up the rent. Then
the principal pays a ￿xed amount based on whether the productivity is improved, which
will be referred to as a ￿xed-bonus contract. If the participation constraint is relaxed, the
manager￿ s pay is tied to the value of the ￿rm, which I refer to as an equity-based contract.
Both types of pay scheme re￿ ect the contractual frictions due to unobservable actions, and
only yield second best managerial e⁄orts. The ￿xed-bonus contract is a type of performance
pay, but low-powered. A manager receives his pay based on a "local" performance indicator:
a ￿xed bonus if and only if a task is implemented. The manager doesn￿ t share the risk with the
￿rm upon any shock in the market. This is a pay structure widely used for managers in small
￿rms or low rank managers in large ￿rms. By contrast, the equity-based contract is a high-
powered performance pay. The managerial compensation is tied to a "global" performance
indicator, and is sensitive to a ￿rm￿ s market value. This is a pay structure popular among
CEOs and other senior managers in large ￿rms.
2.3 Sorting of Pay Contract
According to the optimal contracts and managerial e⁄orts in Lemma 1, the expected value
of a ￿rm with initial productivity a is
V Bonus
f (a) = [
p
2k(’￿￿1 ￿ 1) + 1]
r(a)
￿













where Bonus indicates the ￿xed-bonus contract, and Equity indicates the equity-based con-
tract.
10The expected pay net of the e⁄ort cost for a manager with talent a is
V Bonus









It is straightforward to show that V
Equity
f (a) ￿ V Bonus
f (a). From the ￿rm￿ s perspective,
the high-powered equity-based contract is more e¢ cient than the ￿xed-bonus contract, since
it always yields more value to the ￿rm. However, a manager does not always desire an
equity-based pay scheme. When the surplus to be shared is small, the level of pay to the
manager according to the optimally designed equity-based contract is not enough to induce
participation into the employment relationship. Then the salary to the manager needs to
be increased, which renders the ￿rm￿ s value below a level that it can obtain by using a
￿xed-bonus contract. In this sense, the equity-based pay structure is too expensive for small
￿rms.
With the positive relation between a ￿rm￿ s productivity and its market value in Equation
(2), managerial e⁄ort in a more productive ￿rm creates a larger di⁄erential in the ￿rm value
between good and bad management. Firms sort into di⁄erent pay structures, on the basis of
their initial productivity.
Lemma 2 There exists a unique threshold value a￿ such that ￿rms with initial productivity
a ￿ a￿will use the low-powered ￿xed-bonus contract to pay their managers, and ￿rms with
a > a￿ will adopt the high-powered equity-based contract to pay their managers. The threshold
value a￿, at which both the ￿rm and the manager are indi⁄erent between the two pay schemes,




Proof. See the Appendix.
I will refer to the two types of ￿rms as pay-by-bonus and pay-by-equity ￿rms respectively.
3 Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
In this section, I establish the market equilibrium and characterize the distribution of both
the pay structure and pay level in a closed economy. In equilibrium, the following conditions
must be satis￿ed: 1) all manager-￿rm matches are stable; 2) pay contracts are optimally
designed, and managers exert optimal e⁄orts accordingly; 3) all the people optimally choose
their occupations; 4) a ￿rm is active if and only if it receives a non-negative expected payo⁄;
5) both the labor market and the product market clear.
From this section onwards, I assume that the distribution of managerial talent is subject
to a Pareto distribution G(a) = 1 ￿ a￿￿ over (0;1), where ￿ governs the shape of the
11distribution and the measure of talent inequality.8 A larger ￿ means a ￿ atter distribution
and a lower level of inequality. To guarantee the existence of a meaningful solution to the
economic system, I impose the restriction ￿ > 2(￿ ￿ 1). The existence of equilibrium does
not hinge on any speci￿c distribution as shown in Wu(2011). The speci￿cation of the Pareto
distribution, however, will facilitate the analysis, and is important for a clean characterization
of wage distribution.
3.1 Market Entry and Stable Matching
The matching between ￿rms and managers is bonded by di⁄erent types of pay contract. Given
the contracting environment and market conditions, the pay contracts are optimally designed
by the ￿rms, and the managers choose their optimal e⁄orts. The stability of the matching is
constructed by assumption, and is stable in the sense that given the contractual constraint,
no manager/￿rm pair wishes to rematch with another ￿rm/manager. From (4) and (5), both
the value of the ￿rms and the pay to managers increase in the managerial talent. The joint
surplus created by a match strictly increases in a single exogenous factor representing both
the manager￿ s talent and the ￿rm￿ s initial productivity. The result is (second best) e¢ cient
given the limited liability constraint.
The managerial jobs are created by ￿rms. A ￿rm will enter the market if and only if its
expected value is non-negative, that is, the expected pro￿ts net of the pay to the manager
and workers should be large enough to cover the ￿xed cost F. Therefore the marginal
￿rm/manager will be pinned down by the zero ￿rm value condition: Vf(a) = 0.9 By Lemma 2,
the least productive ￿rms use the ￿xed-bonus pay structure. Then the marginal ￿rm/manager
is de￿ned by
V Bonus
f (a) = [
p
2k(’￿￿1 ￿ 1) + 1]
r(a)
￿
￿ (2 + F) = 0: (6)
3.2 Market Clearing
Clearing the labor market requires that every person in the economy is employed, either
as a worker or as a manager. Unlike in Melitz (2003) where the supply of labor is ￿xed,
labor supply in my model is endogenously determined by people￿ s optimal choice of their
occupations. Denote the number of employed managers M ￿
1 Z
a
g(a)da, which is also the
number of active ￿rms. The supply of raw labor is simply 1 ￿ M. The demand for raw
8The assumption that people￿ s talent is Pareto distributed is standard in the literature on ￿rm heterogeneity
and trade, see for example Helpman et al 2010. Pareto distribution has been widely used to approximate the
observed distribution of ￿rm sizes (Axtell 2001), and the upper tail of wage distribution (Atkinson et al 2011
and the literature therein).
9Such a always exists since Vf(a) is continuous in the domain (0;1) with lim
a!0
Vf(a) < 0 and lim
a!1
Vf(a) = 1.
Uniqueness is guaranteed by the monotonicity of Vf(a).




a g(a)da . The ￿rst term captures the raw labor required for each ￿rm




’a + [1 ￿ e(a)]
q(a)
a is an integrated term, indicating the expected variable raw
labor demanded by a ￿rm that has a probability e(a) to improve productivity from a to ’a.
I assume that all the ￿rms/managers work independently. Then by the law of large number,
e(a) can be regarded as the proportion of ￿rms that successfully improve their productivity
among the ￿rms with initial productivity a.10 In equilibrium, labor demand equals labor
supply:





g(a)da = 1 ￿ M: (7)
The aggregate income of the population includes the total wages paid to all workers and
managers, and the dividend income for share holders.11 Clearing the product market requires
that the total expenditure (the total income) equals the total market value of output (the
total revenues):













where r(a) = e(a)r(’a)+[1￿e(a)]r(a) is the expected revenue of a ￿rm with initial produc-
tivity a. For any individual ￿rm, the revenue r(a) is exhausted by the payment to all the
production workers, the managerial pay including the net value Vm(a) and the compensa-
tion for the e⁄ort costs
e(a)2
2k , and the dividend payment to shareholders (the net ￿rm value
Vf(a)). Market clearing in the labor market and the product market boils down to the same
condition, as the price of goods is related to the wage of production workers by the simple
constant mark-up pricing rule.
Solving either (7) or (8) requires knowledge of e(a) and r(a), which are functions of the
unknown aggregates R and P. Fortunately, the relationship between a ￿rm￿ s revenue and
10This is from an ex ante perspective. Alternatively, we can integrate the labour demand (or other variables)







’) + [1 ￿ e(a)]g(a) if a ￿ ’a;
= [1 ￿ e(a)]g(a) if a ￿ a ￿ ’a:
The minimum productivity of a ￿rm whose manager succeeds is ’a. So ￿rms with ex post productivity
between [a;’a] are those whose managers have talents between this domain and do not succeed in improving
productivity. The ￿rms with ex post productivity a > ’a may come from two sources: the ￿rms run by
managers with talents a > ’a but fails to improve productivity and those run by less talented managers
a
’
but with successful management. This ex post approach will give the same result as the ex ante approach
that I adopt in this paper.
11As the focus of this paper is wage incomes, I keep the distribution of dividen incomes in a black-box.
They can be collected by the government or distributed to workers.

















2k for a 2 [a￿;1);
where r(a) is de￿ned by (6), and r(a￿) in Lemma 2, reproduced here as
r ￿ r(a) =
(2 + F)￿
p
2k(’￿￿1 ￿ 1) + 1
; (11)














The market clearing condition can be written in terms of a single unknown a.
Lemma 3 There exists a unique cuto⁄ value a such that a ￿rm will be active in the market
if and only if its initial productivity exceeds a.
Proof. See Appendix.
The determination of the equilibrium a can be illustrated in Figure 1. As a larger a means
fewer managers and more production workers, the raw labor supply curve LS is upward
sloping in a. From the demand side, an increase in a implies a tougher market. At the
extensive margin, fewer ￿rms remain. At the intensive margin, the remaining ￿rms produce
less and earn less pro￿t, and the managers in the pay-by-equity ￿rms adjust down their e⁄orts.
The demand for production workers declines at both margins, giving rise to a downward
sloping demand curve LD. The intersection of the two curves pins down a unique a. Then
a￿ and the equilibrium aggregates (M;R;P;Q) can be computed accordingly.
3.3 Occupational Strati￿cation and Wage Distribution
Because of the one-to-one mapping between a ￿rm￿ s initial productivity and managerial
talent, Lemma 2 and 3 together imply strati￿cation of people on the basis of their talent.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, people with heterogenous talent sort into di⁄erent occupations
and pay structures in the following way: people with a < a become production workers,
receiving a ￿xed wage; people with talent a 2 [a;a￿) are managers in less productive ￿rms,
receiving a ￿xed-bonus pay scheme; people with a 2 [a￿;1) are managers in more productive
￿rms, receiving an equity-based pay scheme.
14This proposition provides a new angle to look at the composition of labor force. One par-
ticular threshold value of talent creates a sharp division of labor between routine production
and managerial matters. The least talented people will not enter the managerial labor mar-
ket, and can never activate their managerial talent. Among the managerial class, mediocre
ones manage small ￿rms, and in expectation receive a ￿ at salary; the more talented manage
large ￿rms, sharing both the pro￿t and the risk with their employers. To distinguish the
two types of managers, I will refer to the managers who are paid by ￿xed-bonus as salaried
managers, and those paid by equity as equity-paid managers.
Under the speci￿cation of Pareto distribution of talent, the fractions of the salaried and
the equity-paid managers among the managerial class are respectively:
￿ = 1 ￿ (
a￿
a




which can be calculated from (12).
A person￿ s expected wage W(a) = Vm(a) +
e(a)2
2k consists of two components: the net
value of expected managerial pay and a compensation for managerial e⁄orts. W(a) is a step
function of people￿ s talent:
WPW(a) = 1 for a 2 (0;a) ; (14)





￿2 r(a)2 = 2(
a
a￿
)2(￿￿1) for a 2 [a￿;1);
where the subscripts PW;SM and EM indicate worker, salaried manager and equity-paid
manager respectively. Figure 2 depicts the wage curve, combined with the strati￿cation of
occupations and pay structures. Production workers simply earn the unity wage. Mediocre
managers receive a constant wage to compensate their outside option and the ￿xed amount
of e⁄ort. They earn the same amount of wage due to their pay structure in spite of the het-
erogeneity in their generic talent. Finally, the earnings of the equity-paid managers increase
rapidly in their talent, as they share the pro￿ts of the ￿rms. Given the properties of the
Pareto distribution, the wage of the equity-paid managers is also Pareto distributed with a
shape parameter ￿
2(￿￿1) and a minimum value 2. After the operations in the market, the
wage distribution of the equity-paid managers becomes more skewed than the distribution
of their generic talent, as the shape parameter ￿ is scaled down by a factor 1
2(￿￿1). For
a reasonable parameter value of ￿, this market rescaling e⁄ect can transform a fairly even
talent distribution into a substantially skewed wage distribution in favor of the top earnings.
Managerial Wage Premium The population is divided into two classes. The manage-
rial class earns a premium over the working class, because they are talented enough to have
opportunities to exert e⁄orts (invest in human capital), and be rewarded through di⁄erent






= ￿f WSM + ￿￿f WEM;
where the average pay to the salaried and the equity-paid managers are respectively
f WSM = 2; f WEM =
2￿
￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
:
Collecting terms, the average managerial wage is
f WM = 2 +
4(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
￿￿: (15)
Since I normalize the workers￿wage to one, f WM is also a measure of the managerial wage
premium.
Wage Inequality among Managers Being a manager does not necessarily yield a high
wage income. The wage of the mediocre managers is constrained by their pay contract; their
di⁄erence in talent does not result in a di⁄erence in pay. Only when a manager is talented
enough to become an equity-paid manager will his pay be ampli￿ed by a large scale of market
value. The equity-paid managers receive a premium due to the equity-based pay structure,





I construct a series of Theil indices to measure wage inequalities in di⁄erent groups of
people. With the convenience of Pareto distribution, the Theil index for the wage inequality
among the equity-paid managers isTEM =
2(￿￿1)
￿￿2(￿￿1) ￿ ln ￿
￿￿2(￿￿1):
The Theil index to measure the wage inequality within the managers then can be written
as:





￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ ln f WM; (16)
an expression merely in terms of exogenous parameters in the economy.12
Wage Inequality in the Economy The average wage in the whole economy can be
expressed as f W = [1 ￿ (a)￿￿] + (a)￿￿f WM. The between-class Theil index is














ln f WM ￿ ln f W.



















is the Theil index measuring the wage inequality between the equity-paid
managers and the salaried managers.
16Finally the Theil index to characterize the overall wage inequality in the economy can be
decomposed as
T = Tbe + (a)￿￿f WM
f W
TM; (18)
where (a)￿￿ f WM
f W is the wage bill share of the managers in the economy.
4 Trade Openness
In this section, I extend the framework in the closed economy to an open economy with
international integration through trade of goods. Trade takes place within industries between
countries with similar endowments because consumers love varieties as captured by the CES
preferences. For expository convenience, I assume that the open economy consists of two
identical countries, and thus it su¢ ces to analyze the economic activities in the home country.
Throughout the whole section, I will denote economic activities oriented for the domestic
market with a subscript d and for the foreign market with x. The equilibrium variables in
the closed economy presented in the last section will now be indexed with a superscript A
for autarky.
4.1 Equilibrium in the Open Economy
The timing of the game for a representative ￿rm in the open economy is as follows. A
￿rm makes its market entry decision after meeting a manager in the labor market. Having
known the managerial talent and decided to enter the market, the ￿rm o⁄ers a pay contract
to its manager, who has an outside option of being a production worker. Agreeing on the
pay contract, the ￿rm pays a ￿xed cost Fd to start production, and the manager exerts
unobservable e⁄ort to improve the total factor productivity of the ￿rm as in the closed
economy. After observing the realized new productivity, the ￿rm can decide whether to enter
the international market. Access to the foreign market requires a ￿rm to pay a ￿xed cost
Fx to organize distribution networks and other costly activities. Moreover, a ￿rm needs to
ship ￿ > 1 units of a good in order for one unit to reach the foreign destination because of
the iceberg type of trade cost. After realizing pro￿ts in both markets, the ￿rm will pay its
manager according to the pay contract.

















￿ Fx] ￿ b(a)g ￿ s(a) ￿ Fd;
where rd(a) and rx(a) are the revenues of a ￿rm with (ex post) productivity a in the domestic
17and foreign markets respectively, and Ix is an endogenous exporting status indicator, equal
to one if a ￿rm chooses to export and zero otherwise. The constraints faced by the ￿rm
are exactly the same as in the closed economy. A ￿rm will choose its optimal pay contract
according to Lemma 1 with reconsidering the surplus created by the managerial e⁄ort to
improve productivity:













Since a ￿rm faces the same demand elasticity in both the domestic and the foreign markets,
its exporting price is a constant multiplier of the domestic price adjusted by the variable trade
cost: px(a) = ￿1￿￿pd(a) = ￿
￿a. By the assumption of symmetric countries, the exporting
revenue can be written as
rx(a) = Rd(￿a￿Pd)￿￿1 = ￿1￿￿rd(a):
A ￿rm with realized productivity a will export if and only if its operating pro￿t
rx(a)
￿ can
cover the ￿xed cost Fx. As in Melitz (2003), I assume ￿￿￿1Fx > Fd so that no ￿rm can sell
in the foreign market without serving the domestic consumers.
From an ex ante point of view, a ￿rm, after entering the market, has three exporting
options: 1) always stays in the home country; 2) exports only if in a good managerial state;
3) always exports regardless of its managerial state. I will refer to these three types of ￿rms
as local ￿rms, conditional-exporting ￿rms and global ￿rms when distinction among them is
necessary. Denote ad; ac; and ax respectively the minimum productivity for a local ￿rm, a
conditional-exporting ￿rm and a global ￿rm, and rd(ad);rd(ac) and rd(ax) the corresponding
domestic revenues. Obviously ac =
ax
’ < ax. The assumption ￿￿￿1Fx > Fd implies that





The possibility that rd(ad) ￿ ￿￿￿￿1Fx arises in the current model because a ￿rm needs to pay
a manager to start production regardless of its exporting status. This managerial payment
can be regarded as an ￿xed cost for market entry since the least productive ￿rm pays a
￿xed expected wage to its manager . The following assumption will ensure that the least
productive ￿rms are active only in the domestic market.
Assumption 1
2+Fd p
2k(’￿￿1￿1)+1 < ( ￿
’)￿￿1Fx.
Under this assumption, the market entry condition is exactly the same as in the closed
economy:
rd ￿ rd(ad) =
￿(2 + Fd)
p
2k(’￿￿1 ￿ 1) + 1
: (22)
18The equations in (21) become




rx ￿ rd(ax) = ￿Fx￿￿￿1.
The threshold values are linked by the relationship between relative productivity and relative
domestic revenues in Equation (2).
The cuto⁄ value for market entry ad is the key to pin down the equilibrium in the global
economy. Since the two countries are symmetric, ad is determined by the labor market





















where Md is the total number of ￿rms/managers, and Mx is the number of exporting ￿rms in
the home country. In addition to the demand for labor to bear the ￿xed and variable costs for
the economic activities oriented to the domestic market (the terms in the ￿rst line of (24)),
some ￿rms also demand labor for the economic activities to export (the terms in the second
line of (24)). Note that the exporting ￿rms include global ￿rms that always export and the
conditional-exporting ￿rms when they are in a good managerial state. Thus the number of




ax g(a)da. Similar to the analysis of the closed
economy, managerial e⁄orts and ￿rm revenues in both the domestic and foreign markets can
be written as relative to those of the marginal ￿rm. Therefore the labor demand can be
expressed as a downward sloping function of ad. The labor supply is 1￿Md = 1￿
R 1
ad g(a)da,
increasing in ad. The intersection of the two curves pin down a unique cuto⁄ value ad in the
open economy.
Lemma 4 Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique triple of threshold productivity ad <
ac < ax in the open economy such that:
1) A ￿rm will be active if and only if its initial productivity is above ad; Active ￿rms will
always sell in the domestic market.
2) Firms with initial productivity between ad and ac only serve the domestic market; Firms
with initial productivity between ac and ax will export only in a good managerial state, and
￿rms with initial productivity above ax will always export.
3) The threshold productivity for market entry is higher than in autarky, ad > aA.
Proof. See Appendix.
This lemma conveys two important messages. First, ￿rms sort into di⁄erent exporting
status on the basis of their initial productivity. The least productive ￿rms only serve the
19local market, the intermediate ￿rms are conditional exporters, and the most productive ￿rms
become global players. This positive sorting ￿ts the stylized fact that exporting ￿rms are more
productive than domestic ￿rms, as documented in Bernard and Jensen (1995) and Roberts
and Tybout (1997) among others. Second, international trade triggers tougher competition
and induces a selection e⁄ect at the entry margin. This second result can be illustrated
graphically in Figure 1. Holding ad = aA, the number of active ￿rms in the home country
and thus the labor supply (LS) remain unchanged after trade. However, the exporting ￿rms
will increase their labor demand at the intensive margin. First, more production workers are
demanded to bear both the ￿xed and variable costs in order to sell goods in the international
market. Second, managers in the exporting ￿rms will adjust their e⁄orts in response to the
enlargement of market share and pro￿ts. The increase in managerial e⁄orts improves the
productivity of the exporting ￿rms and reinforces the demand for raw labor. As a result,
the LD curves shift upwards to LD0, intersecting with LS at a larger cuto⁄ productivity
for market entry. Intuitively, international trade drives out the least productive ￿rms due
to competition for labor, and resources are reallocated from smaller domestic ￿rms to larger
exporting ￿rms. This is exactly the selection e⁄ect in Melitz (2003); the adjustment at
the managerial margin enhances the selection and creates even more substantial resource
reallocation.
I have shown that in the open economy, ￿rms di⁄er in two endogenous dimensions: pay
structure and exporting status. The impact of trade will crucially depend on the level of
trade openness. My analysis will proceed from a low level to a high level of trade openness,
and ￿nally to complete openness in which every ￿rm exports.
4.2 Low Level of Trade Openness
In this subsection, trade barriers are so large that all the exporting ￿rms operate on a large
scale and adopt the equity-based pay scheme. Local ￿rms are mixed with the two types of
pay structure: pay-by-bonus and pay-by-equity. All the variables in the open economy, if
necessary, will be indexed with a superscript L.
Denote aL
￿ the initial productivity of the least productive ￿rm that uses the equity-based
pay structure. I consider the situation in which aL
￿ < ac: the threshold (initial) productivity of
becoming a pay-by-equity ￿rm is lower than the minimum productivity of being a conditional-
exporting ￿rm. Since the least productive pay-by-equity ￿rm will not export, its revenue is











The domestic revenues of the least productive local, conditional-exporting, and global ￿rms
are de￿ned in (22) and (23).
20Assumption 2 A low level of trade openness: 2
p
2 p
k(’￿￿1￿1) < ( ￿
’)￿￿1Fx.
This assumption is satis￿ed if trade barriers (Fx and/or ￿) are su¢ ciently large. Note






assumed in the closed economy.
Under Assumption 2, managers together with their employers, are strati￿ed by a series




x. The least talented people, with
talent below aL
d, are production workers; mediocre people with talent between aL
d and aL
￿ are
salaried managers; and people with talent above aL
￿ are equity-paid managers. Among the
equity-paid managers, those with talent between aL
￿ and aL
c run the local ￿rms; those with
talent between aL
c and aL
x run the conditional-exporting ￿rms; those with talent greater than
aL
x manage the global ￿rms.
4.2.1 Composition of Pay Structures
As implied in Lemma 4, international trade has an asymmetric impact on ￿rms with di⁄erent
exporting status. After trade openness, local ￿rms face more ￿erce competition directly due
to import penetration and indirectly due to higher labor demand by exporting ￿rms; the
least productive ￿rms cannot survive. Given rL
d = rA and rL
￿ = rA
￿ , the result aL
d > aA in
Lemma 4 implies aL
￿ > aA
￿ . The local pay-by-equity ￿rms are not productive enough to enter
the international market, and su⁄er from tougher competition in the home market without
being compensated with sales in the foreign market. The managerial e⁄orts in these ￿rms
are not as valuable as in the closed economy. The least productive ones cannot a⁄ord the
equity-based pay structure any more, and switch to the ￿xed-bonus pay structure.
Interestingly, the fractions of the two types of ￿rms are not a⁄ected by international
trade. Let ￿L
￿ be the fraction of the pay-by-equity ￿rms in the open economy. Under the















The level of trade openness is so low that the local players are mixed with the pay-by-bonus
and pay-by-equity ￿rms. The two types of ￿rms both bear the pressure of increasing domestic
competition. The decrease in the number of the pay-by-equity ￿rms is proportional to the
total number of ￿rms, leaving the fraction unchanged. The exact identity ￿L
￿ = ￿A
￿ results
from the Pareto distribution. But the intuition that the adjustments at the entry margin and
at the organizational margin move in the same direction and balance one another is general.
214.2.2 Managerial Incentives and Compensation
In response to the optimal pay contracts o⁄ered by ￿rms in the open economy, the managerial
e⁄ort function is as follows:
eL(a) =
p




























for a 2 [aL
x;1):
It can be shown that the managerial e⁄ort is continuous at all the threshold values, and thus
the whole function is continuous in a. As in the closed economy, both the level and the slope
of the managerial e⁄ort weakly increase in a.
Compare (10) with (27). The impact of trade on managerial incentives is uneven across
managers in di⁄erent types of ￿rms. The salaried managers, if remaining in the market, are
not responsive to trade at all, because the ￿xed-bonus pay shields them from the market
changes faced by their employers. Among the equity-paid managers, all the ones working in
local ￿rms adjust their e⁄orts downwards (recall aL
￿ > aA
￿ ), with the least talented becoming
salaried managers. The equity-paid managers in exporting ￿rms may increase or decrease
their e⁄orts depending on the extent of global market competition. The following example
illustrates the mechanism. Take a manager with talent a > aL
x. His e⁄orts before and after
trade are related by
eL(a)
eA(a)












Holding the adjustment at the entry margin constant, for instance in the short run, the
manager￿ s incentive improves by a factor ￿1￿￿. This is the market enlargement e⁄ect due to
access to the foreign market. On the other hand, the entry of exporters enhance competition
in both the domestic and the foreign markets. The magnitude of adjustment at the entry
margin, captured in the second term of (28), re￿ ects the extent of market competition. If
the market is highly competitive, a wide range of less productive ￿rms cannot survive in the
global market (aL
d is large relative to aA
d ); the manager will not work as hard as he used to
because his "excess" e⁄ort will not be rewarded since the market value of the ￿rm declines.
Only when the market enlargement e⁄ect dominates will the managerial e⁄ort increases. This
trade-o⁄ between market enlargement (business stealing) and tougher competition (business
stolen) is a central theme in the literature on competition and managerial incentives (e.g.
Hermalin 1992; Schmidt 1997; Raith 2003; Vives 2008). But the existing studies only concern
homogeneous ￿rms in a partial equilibrium framework. Here the trade-o⁄ arises naturally
22with international trade in a general equilibrium model with heterogenous ￿rms. The uneven
impact of global competition on managerial incentives across ￿rms with di⁄erent productivity
is one main novelty of my model.
The wage function in the economy can be characterized as follows:
WL
PW(a) = 1 if a 2 (0;aL
d);
WL










































￿2 if a 2 [aL
x;1).
Here I use a composite subscript to indicate the type of manager based on pay structure and
exporting status. Compared with the wage function (14), the wage function for the equity-
paid managers in the open economy consists three segments, each for ￿rms with di⁄erent
exporting status. Among them, the wage of the local managers, WL
d;EM(a), is subject to a
truncated Pareto distribution, with a shape parameter ￿




￿ )2 from above; the wage of the global managers, WL
x;EM(a), is Pareto distributed
with a shape parameter ￿
2(￿￿1) and with a minimum value 2(1 + ￿1￿￿)2(
rx
rL
￿ )2. The wage
distribution of the managers in the conditional-exporting ￿rms, WL
c;EM(a), can be written as
a combination of several di⁄erent truncated Pareto distributions.
Figure 3A demonstrates the wage changes when a closed economy moves to a low level
of trade openness. The least talented managers downgrade to production workers, and no
longer receive compensation for their e⁄orts. All the equity-paid managers in domestic ￿rms
receive lower wages due to the ￿rms￿loss in the domestic market; the least able ones become
paid by a ￿xed bonus, and lose the chance to share rents with their employers. The impact of
trade on the equity-paid managers in exporting ￿rms is ambiguous depending on the trade-
o⁄ between market enlargement and tougher competition. If the market enlargement e⁄ect
dominates, the wage curve in the open economy will cut through some value between aL
c
and aL
x, and lie above the wage curve in the closed economy after the threshold (the red
dashed line in Figure 3A). On the contrary, if the competition e⁄ect dominates, the whole
wage curve in the open economy shifts to the right (the blue dotted line in Figure 3A).
Regardless of this ambiguity, international trade increases the wage dispersion among the
equity-paid managers. Consider two equity-paid managers, one in a local ￿rm with talent
a0 2 [aL
￿;aL
c ), and the other in a global ￿rm with a00 2 [aL





a0 )2(￿￿1); in the open economy, their wage di⁄erential becomes
WL(a00)
WL(a0) = (1 + ￿1￿￿)2(a
00
a0 )2(￿￿1). I will illustrate this point further.
234.2.3 Wage Inequality
International trade creates a wage wedge between managers in the domestic and exporting
￿rms, even for those adopting the same pay structure. Using the properties of the Pareto
distribution, the average wage of the (equity-paid) managers in exporting ￿rms is
f WL





￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
>
2￿
￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
= f WA
EM:



















￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
<
2￿
￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
= f WA
EM:
The average wage of the managers in the conditional exporting ￿rms lies between f WL
d;EM and
f WL
x;EM, and can be higher or lower than f WA
EM.
Now I turn attention to the wage di⁄erential between the equity-paid managers and the
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The equality part of the above expression holds because the mean of a Pareto distributed




￿ ) = 2) and the shape
parameter ( ￿
2(￿￿1)). The expected wage of the salaried managers remains constant due to
the ￿xed-bonus pay structure. Therefore the wage gap between the two types of managers
increases after trade, driven by the rise of average managerial pay in the global ￿rms.
Since the fraction of each type of manager remains constant, the average wage of the
managerial class increases:
f WL
M = (1 ￿ ￿L
￿)2 + ￿L
￿ f WL
equity > f WA
M:
It can be shown that the wage inequality between the equity-paid and the salaried managers
is larger than that in the closed economy.13



























(f WM)22(1￿￿￿)(ln f WEM ￿ln2) > 0:
24I summarize the main implications about the impact of trade openness on the distribution
of pay structure and pay level as follows.
Proposition 2 A low level of trade openness (Assumption 2 satis￿ed) leads to the following
results in the home country:
1) The total number of ￿rms/managers decreases; both the numbers of the pay-by-bonus and
the pay-by-equity ￿rms/managers decrease, but the fraction of each type of ￿rms/managers
remains unchanged.
2) The average wage of the equity-paid managers increases.
3) The wage gap between managers and production workers increases.
4) Both the wage dispersion among the equity-paid managers and the wage inequality between
the equity-paid and the salaried managers increase.
Consider two generations of identical people in a country. The ￿rst generation live in the
closed economy, the second generation in the open economy. Compared to his ancestor, a
person from the second generation is less likely to become a manager. Conditional on being a
manager, his chance of receiving a high-powered equity-based pay scheme is exactly the same
as his ancestor. As a pay-by-equity manager, he will on average receive a higher pay level
than his counterpart in the previous generation, but it makes a big di⁄erence whether or not
he works in an exporting ￿rm. The level e⁄ect ￿ a higher average wage of the equity-paid
manager, in particular the pay to the managers in the global ￿rms ￿ is the main source
of wage inequality in the economy. Taking the composition of all workers into account, the
impact of trade on the wage inequality, measured by the Theil indices de￿ned in (17) and
(18), is ambiguous, because the wage distribution becomes more even at the bottom, although
more skewed at the top.
4.3 High Level of Trade openness
If the two countries have already been integrated as described above, what happens if they
continue to reduce trade barriers? Further trade liberalization will increase exchanges of
goods across borders as well as global competition. On the one hand, the advantage of
the previous global ￿rms diminishes, as more ￿rms export. On the other hand, the least
productive ￿rms su⁄er further from competition in the domestic market. These two forces will
a⁄ect the adjustments of pay structure and managerial incentives, and signi￿cantly change
the pattern of managerial compensation. In this subsection, I analyze a situation in which
trade barriers are so low that some pay-by-bonus ￿rms can enter the foreign market.14 All
the variables in the open economy with a high level of trade openness, if necessary, will be
indicated with a superscript H.
14It may be possible that the level of trade integration permits co-existence of two types of conditional-
exporting ￿rms: pay-by-bonus and pay-by-equity. This special case will complicate the analysis without





￿ the threshold productivity/talent of entering the market, be-
coming a conditional exporter, being a global player, and becoming a pay-by-equity ￿rm/manager











1 + ￿￿￿1: (30)
Compared with (25), this threshold value is scaled down by a factor ￿￿￿1
1+￿￿￿1 < 1, because the
value of managerial e⁄ort in an exporting ￿rm is extended to the foreign market, and thus
reduces the requirement of domestic revenues for a ￿rm to adopt the equity-based incentive
scheme. The following condition de￿nes a high level of trade openness.




This assumption implies rx < rH
￿ , and holds for a su¢ ciently small Fx and/or ￿. Under





￿ . A range of pay-by-bonus ￿rms are sorted by their exporting status:
those initial productivity between aH
d and aH
c serve the local market; those between aH
c and
aH
x export conditional on managerial success; those between aH
x and aH
￿ always export. The
￿rms with productivity above aH
￿ are global players that use the equity-based pay structure.
4.3.1 Composition of Pay Structures
As in the economy with low trade openness, international trade changes the mix of ￿rms with
di⁄erent pay structures. The main di⁄erence is that now, the least productive pay-by-equity
￿rms do not necessarily switch to the ￿xed-bonus structure. Combining (12) and (30), the



















In the case of a low level of openness, the second term is absent, and aH
￿ is always greater
than aA
￿ . In the case of a high level of openness, aH
￿ can be smaller than aA
￿ if the market
enlargement e⁄ect (the second term of (31)) dominates the competition e⁄ect (the ￿rst term
of (31)). With su¢ ciently large market enlargement, the adjustment at the organizational
margin reverses: the most productive pay-by-bonus ￿rms will upgrade their pay structure to
the higher-powered equity-based one in order to induce higher managerial e⁄orts. In general,
transforming from a low to a high level of trade openness, the adjustment from the high-
power pay structure to the low-power one slows down, because the pay-by-equity ￿rms are
not discriminated by their exporting status. As a result, the fraction of the pay-by-equity
￿rms among the surviving ￿rms increases. Using the Pareto distribution, the fraction of the












This implies that the fraction of the pay-by-bonus ￿rms declines after trade. Since the total
number of ￿rms decreases, trade reduces the absolute number of the pay-by-bonus ￿rms.
Global competition crowds out the low-powered pay structure.
4.3.2 Managerial Incentives and Compensation
The optimal managerial e⁄ort in the highly integrated economy is
e(a) =
p


















Whether an equity-paid manager increases or decreases his e⁄ort after trade entirely depends
on the adjustment of aH
￿ , which is a su¢ cient statistics for the trade-o⁄ between market
enlargement and tougher competition.
Decompose the population into three groups: production workers, the salaried managers
and the equity-paid managers. The wage function for each group in the open economy is
analogous to that in the closed economy:
WH
PW (a) = 1 for a 2 (0;aH
d );
WH








)2(￿￿1) for a 2 [aH
￿ ;1):
There is no variation in the wage level of production workers or the salaried managers. The
wage of the equity-paid managers is subject to a Pareto distribution with a shape parameter
￿
2(￿￿1) and a minimum value of 2, exactly the same as in the closed economy. I compare
the wage curves in autarky and in trade openness in Figure 3B. The least talented managers
downgrade to production workers. Provided that aH
x 2 (aH
d , aH
￿ ); a range of managers working
in ￿rms with di⁄erent exporting status receive the same level of expected wage. The change
in the wage of the equity-paid managers depends on aH
￿ . If aH
￿ < aA
￿ , the wage curve of the
equity-paid managers in the open economy lies above that in the closed economy; if aH
￿ > aA
￿ ,
an opposite pattern occurs.
274.3.3 Wage Inequality
The impact of trade openness on wage inequality is through the composition of people with
di⁄erent occupations and pay structures. Owing to the Pareto distribution, the average wage





average managerial pay in the open economy is:
f WH
M = 2 +
4(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
￿H
￿ > f WA
M:
Using the Theil index de￿ned in (16), the within-manager wage inequality in the open econ-
omy is:
TH
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I summarize the basic results in this subsection as follows.
Proposition 3 A high level of trade openness (Assumption 1 and 3 satis￿ed) leads to the
following results in the home country:
1) The total number of ￿rms/managers decreases; both the number and the fraction of the pay-
by-bonus ￿rms/managers decrease; the fraction of pay-by-equity ￿rms/managers increases.
2) The average wage of each of the three groups of people ￿ production workers, the salaried
managers and the equity-paid managers ￿ remains the same as in autarky.
3) The wage gap between managers and production workers increases.
4) The within-manager wage inequality increases.
Revisit the example of two generations of identical people, the ￿rst generation living in the
closed economy and the second generation in the open economy. A person from the second
generation is less likely to become a manager. But conditional on being a manager, he has
a better chance to be employed by a large ￿rm and paid by the high-powered equity-based
scheme. What may be striking for him is that when he enters any one of the three groups
of labor force, he ￿nds that on average he receives the same level of pay as his counterpart
in the ￿rst generation. The wage distribution is more disperse in the second generation,
merely because people are diverged towards the upper and lower groups without changing
the average pay level in each group. People in the middle group, the salaried-managers, su⁄er
most from trade openness because some of them are double "discriminated" in both export
status and pay structure. The falling of this middle group is one source of the rising wage
inequality among the managerial class. Again the impact of trade openness on the wage
inequality in the overall economy is ambiguous, because the increasing average managerial
pay is o⁄set by the declining fraction of managers among all the whole population.










￿ 1] > 0.
28Regardless of the level of openness, international trade always increases the average level
of managerial pay and the wage gap between managers and production workers. Moreover,
trade openness tends to increase the wage inequality among the managers. The di⁄erence
that various levels of trade openness bring about is the channel through which trade impacts
on the wage distribution. When the level of openness is low, it is the level e⁄ect ￿ a higher
wage level of the equity-paid managers in global ￿rms ￿ that drives up the wage inequality.
When the level of openness is high, it is the composition e⁄ect ￿ a larger fraction of pay-
by-equity ￿rms ￿ that leads to more inequality. Interestingly, when an economy moves from
a low to a high level of trade openness, both the average pay level and the wage dispersion
among the equity-paid managers decline. This is simply because the equity-paid managers
are no longer discriminated by their export status after the global market becomes highly
integrated.
4.4 Complete Trade Openness
After an economy is highly integrated with the international market, it can be shown that a
further trade liberalization (e.g. a smaller ￿) will keep increasing the fraction of pay-by-equity
￿rms/managers, the managerial wage premium, and the wage inequality within managers.
What would happen if the level of trade openness is so high that all ￿rms are able to export?
In such a fully integrated economy (indicated with a superscript F), Assumption 1 is
violated. Suppose that the pay-by-bonus ￿rms are able to survive as before. The market
entry condition becomes
p
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The fraction of the pay-by-equity ￿rms is smaller in a fully integrated economy than in a
highly integrated economy, although it is still larger than that in the closed economy. This






































k(’￿￿1￿1)(2+Fd+Fx)(2+Fd)(1+￿￿￿1); which is positive if Assumption 1 is violated.
29is not totally surprising. With complete trade openness, no ￿rm is discriminated by its
export status. The adjustment at the entry margin slows down, yielding a more balanced
distribution of pay structure among ￿rms. Given the relationship between the fraction of pay
structure and the average managerial pay (15), and the within-manager Theil index (16),
f WA
M < f WF





Proposition 4 A full level of trade openness (Assumption 1 violated) leads to the following
results:
1) The fraction of the pay-by-equity ￿rms/managers is greater than in autarky, but is smaller
than in the economy with high trade openness.
2) The average wage of each of the three groups of people ￿ production workers, the salaried
managers and the equity-paid managers ￿ remains the same as in autarky.
3) The wage gap between managers and production workers is higher than in autarky, but is
lower than in the economy with high trade openness.
4) The within-manager wage inequality is higher than in autarky, but is lower than in the
economy with high trade openness.
Based on Proposition 2-4, I elicit three general implications about the impact of trade
openness on the distribution of pay structure and pay level.
Result 1 Relative to in autarky, trade openness always leads an economy to a higher level
of managerial pay, a larger wage gap between managers and production workers, and greater
wage inequality among the managerial class.
The ￿rst set of results are in line with a number of recent studies of the impact of
globalization on the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor, and on the wage
inequality among the skilled labor (see the related references in Section 1). The underlying
driving force is essentially the same: opening of trade increases the dispersion of ￿rm revenue,
which in turn increases the wage dispersion of workers whose pay is positively correlated
with ￿rm revenue. What￿ s new in my paper is the economic mechanism that endogenizes the
increasing correlation between a worker￿ s pay level and ￿rm revenue.
Result 2 When an economy moves from autarky to a low level, then to a high level, and
￿nally to a full level of trade openness, the average pay to the equity-paid managers ￿rst
goes up, then moves down to the level in autarky after the high level of openness is achieved;
in contrast, the fraction of the pay-by-equity ￿rms/managers remains constant until the high
level of openness is achieved, and then increases, but ￿nally decreases after complete openness
is achieved.
Result 3 When an economy moves from autarky to a high level, and then to a full level of
trade openness, the wage gap between managers and production workers ￿rst increases, but
then decreases; the within-manager wage inequality follows the same pattern.
30The last two sets of results display the non-monotonic e⁄ect of trade liberalization, as
in Helpman et al (2010). The initial condition of international integration matters for the
impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality. From Result 2 to Result 3, I demonstrate
a channel to capture this non-monotonicity. It is precisely driven by the impact of trade
on the margin of organizational adjustment. The degree of discrimination between the pay-
by-equity ￿rms with di⁄erent export status a⁄ects the composition of pay structures and
the distribution of managerial pay. Thus, organizational forms play an important role in
transmitting the impact of trade liberalization.
5 Conclusion
This paper has brought a modern managerial ￿rm into the study of international trade. Based
on the total factor productivity shifting function of a manager and the contractual frictions
due to limited liability, ￿rms with heterogenous productivity optimally design di⁄erent pay
structures to mitigate di⁄erent levels of agency problems with their managers. The sorting of
￿rms in the dimension of pay structure generates a wage premium for managers who are paid
by an equity-based sharing contract. The interaction between pay structures inside ￿rms and
intra-industrial trade enriches the analysis of a core economic issue: how does international
trade a⁄ect the distribution of incomes across factors of production? Several interesting
results regarding the heatedly debated consequences of globalization have been derived from
the analysis.
One key result is that globalization a⁄ects the provision of managerial incentives inside
￿rms. Integration into a global market confronts a ￿rm with a trade-o⁄ between market
enlargement and tougher competition. The value of managerial e⁄ort, resting on a ￿rm￿ s
pro￿tability, is a⁄ected accordingly. Firms in turn adjust their pay structures to induce
greater managerial incentives (if the market enlargement e⁄ect dominates) or to reduce the
power of incentive provision to avoid higher costs (if the competition e⁄ect dominates). The
change in managerial incentives is an equilibrium outcome of the ￿rms￿adjustment of or-
ganizational structure in response to the changing market conditions. This is related to a
long-standing debate about how market competition disciplines managerial slack. A country￿ s
openness to trade provides a natural setting to examine this issue. At the aggregate level,
globalization may reduce managerial slack, but not because of the traditional wisdom that
people work harder when facing greater competitive pressure; rather, the discipline is more
impersonal: global competition crowds out the lower-powered incentive structure. What I
have highlighted is the heterogenous e⁄ect of globalization on managerial incentives across
￿rms with di⁄erent exporting status and pay structures. This theoretical result provides a
new angle for the empirical examination of the consequences of globalization on managerial
incentives and compensation.
The e⁄ects of trade on ￿rms￿adjustment at the organizational margin and the resulting
31changes in managerial e⁄ort ultimately lead to an impact on wage distribution. Since the
sorting of ￿rms into di⁄erent exporting status and into pay structures with di⁄erent incentive
power are on the common basis of productivity, the ￿rm size wage premium, the pay structure
wage premium, and the exporting wage premium move in the same direction. The positive
correlation between these three types of wage premium, not surprisingly, results in a higher
level of managerial pay, a larger wage gap between managers and production workers, and
greater inequality among managers in an economy with trade openness than in autarky. What
I have emphasized is how the composition of pay structures in the market transmits the impact
of international trade. In particular, when trade openness changes from a low to a high level,
the composition e⁄ect replaces the level e⁄ect to become the driving force of higher managerial
compensation. Moreover, the non-monotonic relationship between the composition of pay
structures and the level of trade openness determines the non-monotonicity between wage
inequality and trade openness. These results shed new light on the current debate about the
surge of top incomes and the widening inequality between the working rich and working poor
in a global context.
The current research has tried to bridge a gap between international trade and organiza-
tional economics. To highlight the e⁄ect of global competition in the product market, I have
shut down trade channels due to comparative advantages or unequal distributions of factor
endowment across countries. I also abstract away from other important kinds of international
trade, for example, FDI and outsourcing. Future work will be devoted to extend the current
framework to incorporate other channels and formats of trade. Focusing on the impact of
globalization on managerial incentives and compensation, I have looked into the black-box
of ￿rms from an incentive perspective, and stressed the role of pay structure inside ￿rms.
However, ￿rms may respond to globalization at various organizational margins. A new line
of research is to build a richer ￿rm structure, for example a combination of the incentive and
the coordination views of ￿rms, in the analysis of international trade.
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Appendix: Proof of Lemmas
A1. Lemma 1
Proof. Since IC is a concave function in e, we replace it with the ￿rst order condition
e = k[b(’a) ￿ s(a)] (IC
0
):
35Substitute this into the principal￿ s objective function:
Vf(a) = e[￿(’a) ￿ b(’a)] + (1 ￿ e)[￿(a) ￿ b(a)] ￿ s(a) ￿ F;
which is decreasing in b(a). So it is always optimal to set b(a) = 0:Then s(a) = w = 0 by the
binding WC.
Case 1) If PC is binding, V Bonus
m (a) = kb(’a)2 ￿ 1




k and eBP(a) =
p
2k.
Case 2) If PC is relaxed, substituting IC
0
; b(a) = 0; and s(a) = 0 into the objective function,
we obtain eRP(a) =
k(’￿￿1￿1)￿(a)
2 and bRP(’a) =
(’￿￿1￿1)￿(a)
2 . Using ￿(a) =
r(a)

































m (a), which determines r(a￿) = 2
p
2￿ p
k(’￿￿1￿1). Therefore, a manager will accept an equity-
based pay contract if a > a￿, accept a ￿xed-bonus pay contract if a < a￿, and is indi⁄erent
between the two contracts at a = a￿. Note V
Equity
f (a) = V Bonus
f (a) at a￿.
A3. Lemma 3
Proof. I prove this lemma with a general distribution of managerial talent. Rewrite the
market clearing condition (7) as
1 Z
a






[1 ￿ M(1 + F)]: (A1)





































































































a )￿￿1 = r￿




g(a)da decreases in a, and the right hand side of (A1) increases in a.
Moreover, the di⁄erence between the left hand side and the right hand side is positive when
a ! 0; and the di⁄erence is negative when a ! 1. By the intermediate value theorem, the
two sides intersect at a single interior point a 2 (0;1).
Under the speci￿cation of Pareto distribution, A1 can be simpli￿ed as:
(a)￿ = (1 + F) +
￿(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
(2 + F) +
4￿(￿ ￿ 1)2





A unique a is determined immediately.
A4. Lemma 4.
Proof. The proof of the ￿rst part of Lemma 4 is similar to the proof of Lemma 3. The proof
of the second part is implied when de￿ning the threshold values. Here I only show the proof
of the third part. Denote all variables in the closed economy with a superscript A, and in
37the trade economy with T. The demand for raw labor in the close economy is










By (24), the demand for raw labor in the open economy is decomposed into two parts:





























￿ the threshold productivity of becoming a pay-by-equity ￿rm in the closed
economy and in the trade economy respectively. Rewrite the labor demand LD and LDD:
























































































By (2), qA(a) = ( a
aA)￿qA(aA) and qT





d ). Since the market entry condition
remains the same by Assumption 1, qA(aA) = qT
d (aT
d ). Suppose aA = aT
d . Then qA(a) = qT
d (a)
for all a. Because access to the foreign market increases the di⁄erential between good and









aA. Hence aA = aT
d implies aT
￿ ￿ aA
￿ . Holding the threshold
productivity for market entry constant,














































2k = eA(a) for a 2 (aA
￿ ;1):
Therefore LDD > LD, and LDD + LDX > LD since LDX > 0. On the other hand, the
supply of raw labor remains the same before and after trade given aA = aT
d . As a result,
the labor demand curve shifts upwards after trade while the labor supply curve remains the
same, implying aT
d > aA as shown in Figure 1.
39Figure 1: Demand and Supply Curves in the Labor Market




















40Figure 3: Impact of Trade on Wage Distribution
Case 1: Low Level of Trade Openness
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